This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on the voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian listed firms. The result shows that there is an increase in the extent of voluntary disclosure in Malaysian listed firms over the eleven-year period from 1996 to 2006. Ownership concentration consistently shows positive association with voluntary disclosure. Firms with higher foreign and institutional ownership have a significantly positive association with voluntary disclosure levels while firms with family ownership exhibit lower voluntary disclosure. Consistent with agency theory, different ownership structures have varied monitoring effects on agency costs and clearly influence firm's disclosure practices. The findings provide insights to policy makers and regulators in their desire to increase transparency and accountability amidst the continual enhancement of corporate governance. The findings provide evidence that optimized ownership structure in any jurisdiction should be considered in any regulatory process that seeks to improve transparency.
Introduction
There have been major changes taken place particularly in strengthening corporate governance, transparency and accountability over the last decade. These changes were largely brought about by the external shocks such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis and high profile corporate collapses. These external events have contributed to renewal of interest in improving corporate governance practices as a means to improve the quality and reliability of information disclosed in annual reports (Kulzick, 2004) . Corporate voluntary disclosure and its determinants have received considerable attention in the accounting literature especially since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The dissemination of discretionary nature of information should reflect as closely as possible the economic reality of a firm's business to stakeholders. Holland (1998) argues that corporate voluntary disclosure is associated with the desire to create favorable institutional and market states, with external benchmarks and pressures on firms for high quality communication.
The Malaysian corporate sector has high level of ownership concentration (World Bank, 2005 ; Mohd Sehat and Abdul Rahman, 2005; Abdul Samad, 2004) . The revamped reporting and governance regimes over the years have improved Malaysian corporate transparency and accountability (World Bank 2005) . However, like many Asian countries, Malaysian legal system is such that the rights of the minority shareholders are weak and regulatory enforcement environment is less stringent (Liew 2007 ). This may induce controlling owners to undertake valuemaximising behaviour at the expense of small shareholders. Ramli (2010) finds the evidence of expropriation of minority shareholders by large shareholders in Malaysian listed firms. Internal governance mechanism is an important monitoring device but the persistently concentrated ownership structure in the hand of large shareholders could influence managerial disclosure decisions depending on efficient monitoring or entrenchment stances. Hence, the purpose of the study is to examine the impact of ownership structure on the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian listed firms.
Many of the Malaysian listed firms tend to be ultimately controlled by the family members, foreigners or local-based institutional groups. The uniqueness of ownership structure in Malaysian corporate sector provides an interesting opportunity to empirically examine how corporate information disclosure is affected in this distinctive socio-economic environment. Prior research identifies ownership structure (either concentration or diffusion) and ownership identities (family, managerial, foreign, institutional or government controlled) as individual determinants of voluntary disclosure using a single regression formulation (Akhtaruddin et Eng and Mak, 2001 ). To extend these prior studies, this study decomposes ownership concentration into three mutually exclusive groups of family-controlled, foreign institutions-controlled and local institutionscontrolled; and recognizing the impact of different types of ownership within the concentrated ownership structure on voluntary disclosures.
The context chosen for the study is the corporate disclosure environment in Malaysia at three key time periods of 1996, 2001 and 2006. The earlier period 1996, taken as pre-1997 Asian financial crisis, represents the period when Malaysia accounting environment was under the merit-based regulatory regime. The period 2001 is chosen to represent the phase with significant accounting and governance reforms implemented in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis. The latter 2006 period reflects a phase of further regulatory initiatives adjustment to boost greater corporate transparency following the high profile international corporate collapses. These time periods are considered critical in terms of Malaysian regulatory and governance changes as a response to internal and external pressures. Little is known about the influence of ownership structure change in the midst of corporate governance change on voluntary disclosure. Hence, the longitudinal approach undertaken in this study allows the investigation of the voluntary disclosure practices in these key periods.
Using a matched-sample of 100 Malaysian listed firms from each of the three periods, the results show that there is an increase in corporate communication over the periods 1996-2006. Malaysian listed firms are disclosing greater information of discretionary nature in the post financial crisis period. Ownership concentration is found to be positively and significantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure in all three key time periods. While foreign ownership and institutional ownership are significant and positive predictors of the extent of voluntary disclosure, family-held firms are associated with lower voluntary disclosure.
This study provides insights on the impact of ownership structure on voluntary disclosure amidst the strengthening of corporate governance from 1996 to 2006. The results shed light on the efficiency of block shareholders' monitoring through greater information sharing. Despite the reforming efforts, the persistently high concentration of ownership over time continues yet in a climate of greater accountability and transparency. This result is important for Asian countries, especially for those firms with high ownership concentration. This study also enriches the voluntary disclosure literature by longitudinally investigating the association between voluntary disclosure, ownership concentration and different types of shareholdings within the concentrated ownership structure.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces institutional background. Section 3 reviews literature to develop hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research approach. The key findings of the study are highlighted in Section 5 followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.
Malaysian Institutional Framework
The Companies Act 1965 provides the principal legislation governing corporate reporting in Malaysia. It recognises the importance of disclosure of financial information of a firm primarily for the benefit of its stakeholders (Rachagan et al., 2002) . For instance, Section 169 of the Act requires all companies incorporated under the Act to furnish financial statements comprising profit and loss accounts, balance sheet and directors' reports. Section 166A mandates these accounts to be prepared and presented in accordance with accounting standards while Section 169 (14) specifies all companies need to comply with the disclosure requirements set out in the Ninth Schedule of the Act.
Up until 1997, the corporate disclosure and reporting practices were largely based on the accounting standards adopted by the two accounting professional bodies, Malaysian Institute of Accountants and Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants. The merit-based regulatory regime (MBR) governed the financial reporting environment. Under such a regime, regulators decided on the propriety of firm transactions, while the management disclosed the information as required and was accountable to the regulators (Securities Commission 1999). Since the disclosure was arguably not user-oriented, the information flow under the MBR effectively lowered market incentives for greater disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Tan and Chew 1996) .
The Malaysian accounting environment continued to evolve as the government announced the establishment of a new financial reporting regime in 1997. Under this new reporting regime, the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) and the Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) were established under the Financial Reporting Act 1997 (FRA). The MASB is tasked with the role of developing and issuing accounting and financial reporting standards. The FRA is designed to address the weak enforcement by giving the force of law to the accounting standards. The new reporting framework heralded a new era for the nation's accounting arena.
Recognising the increasing importance of the Malaysian capital market as a place for raising funds for public companies, the Securities Commission embarked on the threephase 10 shift from the MBR towards the disclosure-based regime (DBR). The DBR entails the making of investment decision by each prospective investor based upon sufficient and accurate information provided. 10 The shift to DBR took effect over a period of five years under three phases: phase one (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) : flexible MBR allowed with enhanced disclosure; phase two (1999) (2000) : hybrid MBR and DBR with further emphasis on disclosure enhancement; and phase three (2001-onwards): full DBR with high standards of disclosure (Securities Commission 1999). This three-phase shift augurs well for the selection of the three time periods (1996, 2001 and 2006 ) in this study.
There is greater market incentive for enhanced disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay 2006 Jensen and Meckling's (1976) agency theory position is that when there is a separation of ownership and control of a firm, the potential for agency costs arises due to the conflict of interest arising from divergent goals between the contracting parties. The conflicting interest between managers and shareholders caused by differences in incentives and information asymmetry may reduce the value of firm. As a result, there is a need for control mechanisms to align the interests of managers and shareholders in order to resolve the agency problem. Patel et al. (2002) suggest that the agency problem could be mitigated by a vigilant board, timely and adequate disclosure of information, and transparent ownership clarifying the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers.
This study focusing on voluntary disclosure presents an excellent opportunity to apply this agency theoretical framework.
Ownership structure is considered as having a strong influence on systems of corporate governance particularly in determining the nature of the agency problem. Within the context of corporate governance, ownership concentration and composition are two key aspects of ownership structure that affect the level of monitoring (Asian Development Bank, 2000).
Ownership Concentration
The degree of ownership concentration is an important determinant of the distribution of power within a firm (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) . The fundamental agency problem in highly concentrated firms is between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Majority ownership is controlled by a small number of large, dominant shareholders who play an important role in monitoring management. There is a reduced agency problem in the highly concentrated firms because of the greater incentive alignment between owners and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 On the other hand, expropriation of minority shareholders' wealth can become a concern when ownership is largely concentrated in the hands of large block holders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1999) argue that high ownership concentration leads to conflicts of interest between large and small shareholders. In the context of disclosure, there is a likely effect of expropriating minority shareholders due to the information asymmetry between controlling (large block) and minority shareholders (Attig et al., 2006) . Large block holders are likely to obscure and delay the disclosure of information to minority shareholders. Fan and Wong (2002) 
Classification of Ownership Types
The identity of shareholders has implications for their objectives and the way they exercise their power, corporate strategy and performance (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) . Studies have shown that disclosure incentives of firms are greatly influenced by the identity of ownership (Gelb, 2000; Lam et al., 1994; Smith, 1976) . Although previous studies have addressed the various types of shareholders, this paper enriches the area by decomposing ownership concentration into three key groups namely, family controlled, local institutional group-controlled, and foreign institutional group-controlled. Such classification would allow the inference of the real differential impacts due to the disparity of monitoring costs and incentives of these different types of dominant shareholders.
Family-controlled
One of the distinctive types of Malaysian corporate ownership structure is the shareholdings by family members. Claessens et al. (2000) document that on average, 59% of public companies is owned and managed by family members. Similarly, the study by World Bank (2005) also provides similar evidence that about 67% of Malaysian firms is managed by the controlling family members. Firms with the concentrated family shareholdings have a better matching of the control rights of the dominant shareholder with its cashflow right. The information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour should be minimized due to the fact that ownership and control still remain one and the same in family controlled firms. However, the dominant control gives the family power to seek private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.
In the context of disclosure, managers in the family-held firms may limit information disclosure to the public in order to prevent leakage of proprietary information to competitors as well as avoid unwanted political and social scrutiny. The unique family ownership generates low demand for adequate disclosure causing a threat to corporate transparency. A number of past disclosure studies reveal the low level of disclosure in family-controlled firms such as, Chau and Gray (2002) 
Foreign Ownership
Many of the multinational firms incorporated in Malaysia are subsidiaries of big conglomerate in foreign countries. According to Malaysia (1991) , foreign ownership in Malaysia was dominant totaling about 62% in 1969. However, a radical change affected by the nation economic policy resulted in the shift of ownership and control to the governmentlinked companies, government-controlled trust funds or agencies (Azham, 2002) . Foreign investment into Malaysia started to increase again in the early 1990s after the liberalization of capital flows (Suto, 2003) . The Malaysian government has broadened equity policy for the manufacturing sector in respect of new investment, expansion and diversification effective July 1998, allowing foreign investors to own 100% equity (Malaysian Industrial Development Authority, 1998). The significance of foreign investment is again emphasised under the Securities Commission's Capital Market Master Plan in 2001 (Securities Commission, 2005). Foreign equity ownership continues to play a crucial role in stimulating the economic growth of the company and the country. The presence of foreigners on board can influence the quality of information disclosure in order to meet foreign reporting requirements.
Foreign owners' presence in the company can influence corporate governance practices, which impacts significantly on firm's disclosure decision. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Barako et al. (2006) find a significant positive association between voluntary disclosure and foreign ownership. This is in line with expectations and supports the argument that obtaining foreign funds means a greater need for disclosure to monitor actions by management. Given the increasing importance of foreign ownership in Malaysian corporate sector, this group of investors can influence corporate disclosure practices of listed firms. Thus, it is hypothesised that the extent of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with a higher proportion of foreign ownership.
Institutional Ownership
The changing Malaysian socio-economic environment witnessed the emergence of institutional investors like provident and pension funds, insurance companies, unit trusts, and government agencies. This category of investors is emerging and seen as an important group of agents in the market for corporate equity because of their ability to exert direct influence on management activities (Abdul Rahman, 2006) 1992) approach, this study applies the unweighted scoring approach where an item scores 1 if disclosed and 0 if it is not, subject to the applicability of the item concerned. A more subjective weighted approach is not used because the focus of this study is not directed at a particular user group. Moreover, prior research has shown that unweighted and weighted approaches produce very similar results when there are a large number of items included (Beattie et al., 2004) . The VDI, calculated for each firm in each period, is the ratio of actual disclosure for each firm and the maximum possible disclosure score for each firm.
Independent and Control Predictors
The independent variables examined in this study include: (i) the ownership concentration as the key variable of ownership structure; and (ii) the family; local-based institutions and foreign ownership as variables of ownership identities.
Based on extant studies ((Liu and Sun, 2010; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Chen and Jaggi, 2000), the following control variables are included: role duality, board independence, firm size and leverage in the statistical analysis. According to Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) , board characteristics are associated with the quality of financial reporting. The strength of corporate governance structure may shape the firm's ownership and control. In addition, firm size and leverage are included as these characteristics affect firm's disclosure behaviour.
Regression Models
Multiple regression models are utilized to examine the relationship between explanatory variables and voluntary disclosure. the proportion of family ownership within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Foreign ownership, FOR is the proportion of foreign ownership within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Institutional ownership, INST is the proportion of institutional ownership within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Role Duality, RDUAL is coded one where the role of Chairman is independent of Chief Executive Officer, and zero otherwise; Board Independence, BIND is coded one where independent non-executive directors comprise at least one-third of the board membership, and zero otherwise; Firm size, FSIZE is natural log of total assets; and Leverage, LEV is the ratio of debt to equity. 1.66 * significant at 0.01 levels (one-tailed tests). The t-statistic is derived using a paired sample t-test. The t-tests are performed to examine differences between the means of the voluntary disclosure index over the study period. The paired comparison t-tests are to determine whether the means of the distribution of differences in values of voluntary disclosure index is zero.
In addition, the descriptive results reported in Table 1 Table 3 indicate that whilst there are a number of independent variables that are significantly correlated with each other, none of the coefficients are greater than 0.8. This suggests that multicollinearity is not a major problem in this study.
Besides, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is used to test the presence of multicollinearity in the regression model. The VIF figures (not reported in Table 4 ) of all the predictor variables are below 2.5. Hence, both correlation and VIF results support the absence of multicollinearity in these variables. 1.000 * p < 0.01, one-tailed; ** p < 0.05, one-tailed. VDI is voluntary disclosure index for each sample firm; Ownership concentration, OCON is top 5 shareholder concentration; Family ownership, FAM is the proportion of family ownership within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Foreign ownership, FOR is the proportion of foreign ownership within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Institutional ownership, INST is the proportion of institutional ownership within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Role Duality, RDUAL is coded one where the role of Chairman is independent of Chief Executive Officer, and zero otherwise; Board Independence, BIND is coded one where independent non-executive directors comprise at least one-third of the board membership, and zero otherwise; Firm size, FSIZE is natural log of total assets; and Leverage, LEV is the ratio of debt to equity.
Regression Results
The multiple regression results reported in Table 4 show the explanatory power of the ownership concentration and ownership identities for each period. The multiple regression models report significant F values (at the 1 percent level) for the level of voluntary disclosure in all periods. All reported adjusted R 2 for both multiple regression models are over 40%, which suggest that a significant percentage of the variations in voluntary disclosure can be explained by the variations in the predictor variables.
As reported in Table 4 and Xiao and Yuan (2007) . Thus, the positive hypothesis is supported throughout the elevenyear period in this study. The findings imply that companies with concentrated ownership in the hands of large shareholders appears to be a more important monitoring tool to mitigate agency problems by influencing greater disclosure in annual reports. It may reflect a firm's choice of governance and disclosure practices when investor protection is weak.
The regression results of the decomposition of ownership concentration into family, foreign and institutional ownership are reported in Table 4 Firm size (FSIZE) is positively and statistically significantly (at the 1% levels) associated with voluntary disclosure in all years. Firm size influencing the extent of voluntary disclosure has been well documented in previous studies. Large firms tend to disclose information more extensively because of the exposure to public scrutiny (Schipper 1981) , the need to raise capital at the lower cost (Botosan 1997) , and the need to minimize high agency cost typical in large companies (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) . However, leverage lacks statistical significance in all years, suggesting that a company's gearing status has no significant association with the extent of voluntary disclosure. The result is consistent with Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) .
Additional Analysis
The preceding multiple regression analysis provided in models 1 and 2 assumes the exogenous determination of ownership structure variables. The endogeneity concern caused by unobservable firm-specific factors and omitted variables such as operational characteristics between firms may cause OLS estimates to be biased (Larcker et al. 2007 ). In a recent study, Andres (2008) maintains that ownership structure is endogenously determined by firm performance. A potential correlated omitted variable problem may occur where there are factors that may potentially affect ownership structure, and that may affect voluntary disclosure of information simultaneously (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005) .
The study attempts to control for the omitted variable problem by examining the association between the change in the levels of ownership structure and change in voluntary disclosure over the study period. This approach is appropriate since there is less likely to be a corresponding change in any potential omitted variable that is correlated with both the dependent and independent variables. Thus, an additional regression model (not shown for brevity) is estimated to examine whether changes in ownership Family ownership, FAM is the proportion of family ownership within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Foreign ownership, FOR is the proportion of foreign ownership within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Institutional ownership, INST is the proportion of institutional ownership within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Role Duality, RDUAL is coded one where the role of Chairman is independent of Chief Executive Officer, and zero otherwise; Board Independence, BIND is coded one where independent non-executive directors comprise at least one-third of the board membership, and zero otherwise; Firm size, FSIZE is natural log of total assets; and Leverage, LEV is the ratio of debt to equity.
Conclusions
This paper has examined factors influencing the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 1996 to 2006. In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, numerous corporate governance and regulatory reforms have taken place during the eleven-year period to enhance corporate transparency and accountability. Yet, the proportions of ownership structure remain relatively unchanged over time. The empirical results of match-paired samples in each key time period show that the ownership concentration is consistently positively associated with voluntary disclosure. The positive association of ownership concentration may reflect the firms' choice to disclose more information as a governance initiative to monitor managerial activities. This concurs with the theoretical argument that large, dominant shareholders are taking the efficient monitoring stance. Institutional and foreign owned firms have the motivation to disclose in excess of mandatory requirements. Consistent with the agency theory, institutional and foreign investors in a firm have a greater monitoring role in pushing firms to voluntarily disclose more information in annual reports. Such enhanced disclosure practice should be encouraged in order to attract funds from investors, both locally and abroad. Further, it is important that the management appreciates the importance of effective communication to the capital market especially its direct link to the reduction of cost of capital and subsequent increases in firm value and wealth creation for the shareholders. However, the findings also reveal that firms held by family members are reluctant to disclose information, reflecting the tradition of secrecy inherited from the past. Such firms are controlled by family members with very few foreign or local institutional investors, thus, the demand for information is less leading to lower level of disclosure.
The The study makes several contributions as follows. First, it strengthens the importance of separating ownership structure into various strands of ownership to infer the real impact of differential controlling properties on managerial disclosure decisions. Second, it sheds light on the efficiency of ownership concentration in terms of information disclosure and management monitoring in a country where investors protection is weak. Third, this study adds to the literature on the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure by examining the association between voluntary disclosure and ownership concentration and composition using matched sample over eleven-year period when regulatory and governance changes are eminent.
The findings of the study have implications for disclosure policies and the governance initiatives. The results provide the evidence that ownership structure should be considered in any regulatory process that attempts to improve transparency. Multi-ownership and optimizing ownership structure, particularly with the shareholdings by foreign and institutional investors, need to be on the national reform agenda. The ownership concentration in external shareholders tends to provide a good monitoring mechanism to lessen the opportunity of expropriation and promote greater efficiency in information sharing. The family-controlled firms have little motivation to disclose information in excess of mandatory requirement. In view of the structural feature of the Malaysian stock market providing a countervailing force to the growing pressures for internationalization and global transparency, the findings provide important implications for regulators, investors and companies. The longitudinal findings can resonate in Asian countries where corporate ownership is characterized by concentrated structure.
There are limitations in this study. First, the study draws conclusions about the extent of voluntary disclosure, not on its quality and informativeness of disclosure. Second, the voluntary disclosure index is calculated based on the researcher-constructed instrument. The index calculation can be affected if on the items of information selected are not voluntary in nature. Third, it focuses on one avenue of corporate disclosure via corporate annual reports. Future research could investigate the quality of voluntary disclosure and could possibly explore the extent to which firms voluntarily release information through other communication channels such as press release and the internet.
